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In this paper we evaluate the expected evolution of the Trattamento di ￿ne rapporto over the Italian
employees￿working life careers. We use adiminstrative (INPS) data to disentangle the amount that is
expected to be accumulated until retirement, the amount expected not to accrue because of discountinuos
working careers and/or paid as an anticipated withdrawal. This is relevant in the light of the recent
pension system reforms that encourage the diversion of the TFR to pension funds.
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11 Introduction
Recent pension reforms in Italy bring up to the role of the Trattamento di Fine Rapporto in ￿nancing private
pension provisions for Italian employees. However, the TFR may be used over working careers before
retirement in case of job termination or to ￿nance speci￿c needs. In this paper, we evaluate the fraction of
TFR that is expected to be available at retirment for pension ￿nancing.
In particular, employees are entitled to the lump-sum leaving indemnity payments (TFR) upon job ter-
mination. For each employee, each year of the job relationship the employer accumulates a fraction (6.91%)
of the annual salary which is recapitalized at a pre de￿ned interest rate (1.5% +0.75 of the annual in￿ ation).
The accumulated TFR fund is then paid when a job separation occurs, regardless its reason, or at retire-
ment. Under speci￿c circumstances, the employee working more than eight consecutive years with the same
employer can obtain a partial withdrawal on the accumulated TFR.
Thus, the TFR is a mandatory saving fund that may play three roles. First, it may contribute to build one￿ s
pension wealth. In case of continuous job careers until retirement the leaving indemnity represents a lump
sum payment totally available to ￿nance the individual￿ s retirement needs. Second, in case of discontinuous
job careers, the recipient may freely dispose of the amount received upon contract termination, voluntary
or not. Thus, TFR represents additional private savings freely disposable to smooth consumption either for
precautionary motives, for example to self-insure in case of layo⁄ followed by an unemployment spell or for
whatever purpose1. Third, the TFR can be used before job termination, though under some restrictions, to
￿nance speci￿c needs, namely residential home purchase or medical care, thus in this case it turns out to be
useful to overcome liquidity constraints or to avoid to draw from other private savings.
In this paper, we take the point of view of Italian employees in the private sector and study the expected
distribution of the TFR over their working life career among the three components. In particular, we
disentangle how much of the TFR is expected to be accumulated until retirement and thus available as private
retirement wealth, from the amount that is expected to become available during the working life career upon
job termination and/or is taken as advanced withdrawal. In order to evaluate the three components we use
data from the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) drawn from matched employers-employees administrative
archives which provide detailed information on individual job spells, earnings and the accumulated TFR.
However, since these data do not convey information about wealth, consumption or savings we are unable to
observe whether the TFR withdrawn before retirement is used as precautionary wealth or to increase private
savings. Nevertheless, combining the information on working life careers and on the evolution of the TFR,
our analysis turns out to be valuable since we are able to evaluate the expected amount that at each age fails
1Borella et al. (2008) ￿nd that the TFR recipients upon voluntary job termination increase the amount spent on durables.
2to continue to accumulate in the TFR account due to job discontinuity or advanced withdrawing behavior.
This is relevant in the light of the recent reforms which make the annual ￿ ows of the TFR the primary
source for Italian employees￿ private pension wealth. According to the reforms, employees must decide
whether to retain the TFR within the ￿rm or to divert it to pension funds2. Despite that the primary
scope of pension funds is to accumulate wealth for supplementary retirement provisions, participants may
obtain advanced withdrawals upon job termination and/or for speci￿c needs, just as in the case of the TFR
within the ￿rm. The reforms will succeed in achieving adequate supplementary treatments to the extent that
workers opt for diverting the TFR to pension funds but also to the extent that they do not face discontinuous
job careers and/or binding liquidity constraints. The higher the risk of entering unemployment then the
higher the amount that is expected to be diverted from the pension fund and that is expected to fail to
accrue for retirement purposes. Moreover, even in the case of continuous working life careers, the expected
amount available at retirement decreases when there￿ s higher chance of taking advanced withdrawals for
speci￿c liquidity needs.
Prior research has studied the behavior of participants in pension funds vis ￿ vis lump sum distribution
option when they face a job separation. US data evidence that the majority of workers cash out from pension
funds upon job separations (Poterba et al. 1998; Burman et al. 1999). Importantly, cashing out patterns
tend to display a high degree of heterogeneity being inversely related to age, earnings and entitlements size
(Yakoboski, 1997 and Engelhardt, 2002). This evidence raises the concern about the adequacy of retirement
bene￿ts, especially for low income earners and those who have accumulated lower amount of ￿nancial wealth.
Indeed, Hurd and Panis (2006) ￿nd that among plans that allow for a lump sum distribution upon job
separation, 20% is on average cashed out and that cashing out is more frequent among low income earners
thus with higher probability of being poor also at old ages.
In particular, the empirical analysis carried out here takes the point of view of Italian employees who
opt for maintaining the TFR within ￿rms3 and evaluate the portion that is expected to be accumulated
until retirement (Retirement-TFR from now on) as well as the expected leakage that potentially undermines
the accumulation of the TFR because of the threat of job separation (Bu⁄er-TFR from now on) or due to
advanced withdrawals to ￿nance speci￿c needs (Liquidity-TFR from now on). The ￿rst two components,
Retirement -TFR and Bu⁄er-TFR are the two sides of the same coin, being related to the employment
risk faced by individuals. Other things being equal, the expected Retirement- TFR depends on the chance
2More precisely, after the reform, for workers employed in large ￿rms (more than 50 employees) the TFR is accumulated in
a public fund managed by the Italian Bureau for Social Security (INPS) rather than by single ￿rms. TFR that accumulates in
this public fund follows the same rules as the TFR accumulated in single ￿rms, thus, in this paper we will refer to it as "TFR
within ￿rms".
3Alternatively, our analysis could equally rationalize the evolution of the TFR for workers who had chosen to divert the TFR
into a pension fund whose resources are managed with the aim of replicating the rewarding of the TFR within ￿rms (1.5% plus
0.75 of the annual in￿ation rate).
3of being employed and of remaining employed, while the expected Bu⁄er-TFR is related to the chance of
loosing the job. The amount of the expected Liquidity-TFR is directly linked to the advanced withdrawing
propensity of workers. To derive the expected composition of the TFR we rely on a probabilisitc model that
tracks the TFR available to Italian employees at each age of their working life careers conditional on being
employed4.
We evidence that on average the largest amount of the accumulated TFR is expected to be available at
retirement. However, the expected Bu⁄er-TFR can overcome Retirement-TFR if the probability of separation
is high and the chance of re-employment is low, namely for females, blue collars, workers in southern regions
and in the construction industry. For example, for females woking in small ￿rms it may account on average
for 50% of the total potential TFR. Moreover, our empirical analysis on the expected Liquidity-TFR points
out that only a minority of workers cashes out their TFR during the working life.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2. introduces the probabilistic sequential model for the accu-
mulation of the TFR. The dataset used for the empirical analysis is described in section 3. The econometric
approach and results are reported in Section 4 and Section 5 while in section 6 we derive the expected TFR
distribution between the Retirement -TFR, the Bu⁄er-TFR and the Liquidity-TFR as de￿ned above. Section
7 concludes.
2 The model for the accumulation of the TFR
In this section we model the evolution of the TFR and its three components over the employees￿working
life careers.
At year t, the TFR that is potentially available to the representative worker of working group g (with
g = 1;:::;G)5 is:
TFRt = pe






where, TFRt￿1 is the stock accrued until the end of year t￿1, ￿t is the annual in￿ ation rate and yt the
expected annual labor income, pe
t￿1 and pu
t￿1 are the probability of being employed and unemployed in t￿1
respectively6 while ￿ue
t is the probability to become employed in t if unemployed in t ￿ 1.
4Alternatively, we could evaluate the unconditional expected composition of the TFR at each point of the life cycle, i.e. the
amount that is expected to accumulate if employed and the amount that could be accumulated but fails to accrue because of
the persistence in the unemployment status.
5The G working groups are de￿ned on the basis of employees￿demographic and occupational characteristics observed in the
data described in next section. In particular, we consider gender, cohort, type of occupation, industry, ￿rm size and geographic
area.
6We focus on these two states only because, as specifyed in next section, the data used in this paper convey information on
job spells but does not enable to distinguish voluntary from unvoluntary non employment spells.
4Given TFRt, the stock that is expected to accrue at the end of t is:
Retirementt = pe
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t is the probability of job continuation conditional of being employed in t ￿ 1 and ￿t is the
probability of taking an advanced withdrawal in t.
The amount that is expected to be withdrawn for speci￿c needs is:
Liquidityt = pe
t￿1￿ee
t TFRt￿1(1:015 + 0:7￿t )￿t (3)
and, given the probability of job termination in t (￿eu
t = 1 ￿ ￿ee
t ), the amount that is expected to be
paid upon the separation, if it occurs, is:
Buffert = pe
t￿1TFRt￿1(1:015 + 0:7￿t )￿eu
t (4)
In this paper, we evaluate (1) ￿ (3) and the relative role of the three components:












To evaluate (1) ￿ (3) at each point of the working careers we take as given the expcted annual labor income





and the the probability of taking advanced withdrawals ￿t. In particular, to obtain the transition distribu-
tions between the two relevant labor market states we develop a reduced-form analysis of the employment
and nonemployment duration of Italian employees in the private sector controlling for both observed and
unobserved heterogeneity. In section 4:we detail the empirical analysis and report the results.
The proportion that is expected to be taken in advance for speci￿c needs is a⁄ected directly by ￿t and
indirectly by the chance of not experiencing a job separation. In section 5 we present the empirical approach
and results for the advanced withdrawing behavior (￿t ) observed in the data.
In section 6 we report the results on the expected distribution of the TFR implied by the derived prob-
ability distributions. In the following section we describe the data that we use to conduct the empirical
analysis.
53 The Data
In this paper we use the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) provided by Laboratorio Riccardo Revelli.
WHIP is a database of individual work histories, based on INPS (the Italian National Social Security Institute)
administrative archives. The panel consists of a random sample (1 : 180) drawn from the full archive of a
dynamic population of about 370;000 permanently and temporary employed in the private sector or self-
employed or retired over the period 1985 ￿ 2004. The dataset allows observing the main episodes of each
individual￿ s working career. The main drawbacks of the data is that they do not convey information on
household composition, education, and other relevant demographic variables.
For this paper purposes, we consider blue and white collar employees working full time7 in the private
sector, aged between 20 and 60 years old. Our sample covers about 62;000workers, 72% are men and 28%
are women, the median age of men is 36, while the median age for women is 33. We observe multiple job
spells over the period 1985 ￿ 20028. We exclude from the analysis job spells left truncated at January 1985
since for them we cannot distinguish true new hiring, thus we end up with a total of about 145;000 single
job spells9 .
Table 1 reports the distribution of observed jobs by occupation. Males￿job spells, which represent the
65% of the total number of job spells, are more densely concentrated in blue collar occupations than females￿
job spells (88% against 67%). Manufacturing is the largest industry for both males (38%) and females (37%),
the second one for males is construction (27%) which instead accounts only for 1% of total females￿jobs.
The remaining industries, here called Services10, cover 60% and 36% of females￿and males￿jobs respectively.
Small and medium size ￿rms (less then 20 employees) provide the majority of jobs (about 56%) for both
males and females, while about 7% of job spells are provided by ￿rms with more than 1;000 employees. The
majority of jobs, 52% of the total, are located in northern regions, 17% in the central regions and 30% in
south, however, the gender gap is higher in southern regions where males hold the 64% of observed jobs.
In Figure 1 we report, in left and right panel respectively, the (mean) annual earnings pro￿les by type of
occupation for female and male workers. The earnings pro￿le for blue and white collars exhibits upward slope
over the life cycle with a reverse ￿U￿shape reaching the maximum at the age of 50th. Annual labor income
for white collars is steadily increasing till age of 40th while it is quite ￿ at for blue collars: the average annual
growth rate is about 5% and 3% for male and female white collars respectively, while for blue collars, both
male and female, it is 1%. The gender gap in annual earnings, measured as the he ratio of female earnings
to male earnings is increasing over the life cycle re￿ ecting di⁄erences in education, experience, labor supply
7Part time workers correspond to the 8.9 percent of the sampled population.
8We use the restricted sample since complete information job spells for years 2003 and 2004 are not yet available.
9Left truncated job spells account for 16% of the total job spells.
10For this paper purposes, industries included in the macrosector Services are: Utilities, Trade, Transports and others.
6and possibly discrimination.
In Figure 2 we report the (mean) stock of the accumulated TFR by type of occupation for males and
females, respectively. The inverse ￿U￿ shaping of the TFR re￿ ects the labor income dynamics over the
working life careers. Di⁄erences in levels and growth rates of annual labor income translates in di⁄erent
TFR-age pro￿les, thus, the TFR accrued for white collars is sensibly higher than for blue collars, while the
stock accumulated for females is lower with respect to males.
In addition to earnings, also job stability a⁄ects the amount of the accumulated TFR. As detailed in the
previous section, to evaluate the expected distribution of the TFR we rely on the analysis of the discontinuity
of job careers. Since the data used in this paper originate from administrative archives we are unable to
distinguish voluntary from involuntary job interruption spells. Consequently, we cannot distinguish, among
the observed non-employment episodes, true unemployment spells from the out of the labor force spells. In
this paper, we treat equally all the observed job interruptions and evaluate the chance of not being employed
over the life cycle and its implications for the expected TFR accumulation process. Given this clari￿cation,
hereafter, we use indi⁄erently the term unemployment and non-employment state. In Table 2 we report the
average duration of employment and unemployment spells11 by age classes12. The mean duration of job spells
is hump shaped with respect to age at entry, while the unemployment duration appears to be convex in initial
age. In particular, employment tends on average to last longer than unemployment at middle ages suggesting
a higher probability of being employed during this phase of the working life with respect to younger and older
ages. If this is the case, given the observed hump shaping in labor income pro￿le, then we should observe at
middle ages the highest values of the expected Retirement ￿ TFR, i.e. the TFR that is expected to continue
to accrue until retirement.
The stock of TFR is a⁄ected also by the advanced withdrawing propensity. According to the Italian law,
employees with more than 8 years of service are entitled to early withdrawals from the accrued stock during
the same job to buy a primary residence for themselves or their sons or to cover exceptional medical expenses.
The amount withdrawn should not be higher than 70% of the account and at ￿rmwide level, only 10% of
employees with at least 8 year seniority and up to 4% of total employees are allowed (each year) to take
advanced withdrawals13. However, these restrictions may be overcome upon the employer approval. Indeed
in our data we do ￿nd evidence that workers with less than 8 years of seniority or employed in small size
￿rms (less than 25 employees) take withdrawals, and that the amount may be higher than the 70% of the
11The unemployment spells are de￿ned as starting at the end of a recorded job spells and ending at the re-employment in the
private sector (observed in the panel), provided the workers does not retire in the period 1985-2002; if re-employment does not
happen before the end of 2002 or the worker does note retire I treat the unemployment spell as censored.
12Age is measured at the beginning of the spells.
13According to these limits at ￿rmwide level ￿rms with less than 25 employees may not allow them to take advanced withdrawals
from the stock of TFR.
7existing stock. Thus our analysis of the advanced withdrawing behavior is extended to include all observed
withdrawals which satisfy the conditions detailed below.
In particular, to study the advanced withdrawing behavior we do create a binary variable WITH indicating
whether the worker takes advanced withdrawal from the existing stock of TFR. WITH takes value 1 if there￿ s
a negative change in TFR and 0 if not. More precisely, WITH is equal to 1 if a negative change in TFR
occurs before the last year of service in case of jobs that last at least 4 years and if it amounts at least to
400 euro and if it is at least 20% of the stock accrued14. The sample composition of the spells that last at
least 4 years is reported in the last column of Table 1: In this subsample, males are slightly more represented
(67%), suggesting that on average males achieve longer tenures than females15. The manufacturing sector
provides a higher number (58%) of more tenured jobs rather than construction (9%) and the services (33%)
sectors. Relatively longer contracts are more frequent in the North -West (36%). Small ￿rms (with less than
20 employees) are under represented in the sample of more tenured job relations, while largest ￿rms (more
than 200 employees) are more represented in it.
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics on advanced withdrawals observed on the subsample of job
relationship that last at least 4. The total numbers of observed advanced withdrawals is modest, only the
4:8% of individuals-years pairs is a⁄ected by withdrawals which correspond to the 8:4% of the total number
of observed job relationships lasting more than 4 years. Table 3 in ￿rst column reports the distribution of
advanced withdrawals across individual and occupational characteristics over individual-year observations.
The propensity to withdraw measured with respect the individual-year pairs is quite homogeneous across
occupational characteristics, while it shows some peculiar di⁄erences when measured with respect the number
of job relations as reported in the second column of Table 2. According to our data (see Table 3, second
column) advanced withdrawals are more frequent in medium and large ￿rms (13% in ￿rms with more than
1000 employees, around to 9:4% in ￿rms with 20 ￿ 199 employees, 8:4% in ￿rms with 10 ￿ 19 employees
and 6:3% in ￿rms with less than 10 employees). The highest percentage of jobs a⁄ected by withdrawals is
observed in the north-western regions (9%), while the lowest is found in southern regions (8:6%). In the
manufacturing sector, the 9:7% of jobs are interested by a withdrawal while the corresponding value for
construction sector is 5:7%. White collars show a higher propensity (9:3%) to withdraw then blue collars
(8%) while females tend to withdraw less frequently than males (7:3% against 8:7%).
Figure 3 reports the age distribution of the propensity to withdrawal for female and male workers, by
cohort and occupation. Females show on average less propensity to withdraw than males at all ages. The
14The choice of these arbitrary threshold is due to limit the role of the measurement error of the event of interest (Garibaldi
and Pacelli, 2008).
15Table 1 shows that the median duration of males￿employment spells is one years, sligthly less that for females (1:16 years).
However, when employment spells which last more than (or equal to) 4 years are considered, the median duration for males is
slightly higher (7 years vs 6:8 years).
8propensity to withdraw is hump shaped with respect to age, workers aged between 30 and 40 years old are
more likely to take the anticipation option than the youngest (20￿30 years old) and the elderly (40￿50 and
more than 50). The average proportion of withdrawals is 4:8%, starting from the minimum 3%, at age 24,
it increases with age and reaches a peak of about 6% around 35 years old and stabilize at a level of about
3:5% at older ages. This evidence seems to con￿rm that the anticipated withdrawals, being more frequent at
younger and middle ages, are more likely to serve for home purchasing rather than for medical care.
4 Empirical analysis of working life careers
In this section we carry out the analysis on working life careers to derive the empirical counterparts of the
process that drives the evolution of the TFR. We rely on non parametric and parametric duration analysis of
employemnt and unemployment spells to determine the transition distributions among labor market states.
4.1 Non parametric analysis
In Figure 4, we plot the Kaplan-Meier (K-M) empirical hazard rates from the employment and unemployment
status respectively against the length of employment/unemployment spells. In the left chart of Figure 4 we
plot the hazard function for employment spells. The decreasing shape of the hazard rate is evidence of
negative duration dependence for job spells. Thus, the probability of a job separation is an inverse function
of the job tenure indicating that job relationships are much more unstable at their start, while they become
more stable as the tenure gets longer.
The right chart of Figure 4 plots the K-M hazard function for unemployment spells. The downward-
slope of the hazard is evidence of negative duration dependence indicating that the long-term unemployed
have less chance of ￿nding a new job than the short-term unemployed. Negative duration dependence is well
documented in literature (see e.g. Heckman and Borjas, 1980; Flinn and Heckman, 1982; and Lynch, 1989). It
may be due to the fact that long unemployment durations discourage workers to search a new job (Schweitzer
and Smith, 1974). Moreover, it may be due to deterioration of skills (see e.g. Pissarides, 1992), or it may
be signal of unobserved lower productivity (Vishwanath, 1989), or it may be the result of strong competion
for jobs among workers. Moreover, duration dependence in unemployment may arise in a framework were
job opportunities are spread through an explicitly network of social contacts (Calv￿-Armengol and Jackson,
2004).
In the next subsection we proceed to analyze parametrically the nature of the relationship among the
individual and occupational characteristics and the hazards allowing for unobserved heterogeneity.
94.2 Parametric analysis
4.2.1 Econometric speci￿cation
We carry out the parametric analysis of employment and unemployment spells estimating two separate
continuous time parametric Weibull models to assess the impact of causal variables on the extent of the
duration dependence in employment and unemployment status16. We privilege continuous time to discrete
time techniques as in the ￿rst case results are invariant to the time unit used to record the available data
(Flinn and Heckman, 1982) and thus enabling to derive the life cycle pro￿le of the probabilities conditional
on whatever length of the employment/unemployment spells. Moreover, since the presence of unmeasured
variables could give rise to spurious negative duration dependence (see Heckman, 1991), we take into account
the impact of unobserved heterogeneity and we allow for a multiplicative shared frailty distributed as a
gamma17.
According to the adopted approach, the instantaneous hazard rates for unemployment (u) and employment
(e) spells are modelled as following:






j with j = u;e (8)





is the baseline hazard that here takes the
Weibull distribution, ￿0XA is a linear combination of observed demographic and occupational characteristics,
￿
j is the multiplicative e⁄ect that captures unobserved heterogeneity.
Observed heterogeneity is controlled for by a set of covariates XA that capture individual and job char-
acteristics.
Previous studies evidence that transitions between labor market states are a⁄ected by time elapsed in
the current state but also by time spent in the previous state. (see for example Heckman and Borjas, 1980;
Heckman and Flinn, 1982), thus, we allow for both duration and lagged duration dependence as well as time
dependence. Among covariates we include age, daily salary which capture the time dependence, as well as the
length of the previous employment (non-employment) spell which captures the lagged duration dependence.
In addition we consider explanatory variables that are ￿xed over the spell and over the life cycle and are
measured at the beginning of the spell18, they include: cohort, gender, type of occupation, industry, ￿rm size
16We choose this model instead of the widely used semiparametric proportional Cox￿ s model because the latter does not
specify a parametric form for the hazard preventing to derive the transition probabilities of interest. In many cases, the two
approaches (parametric vs semiparametric) produce similar results in term the e⁄ect of explanatory variables on the hazard rate
(see e.g Petrongolo, 2001).
17The data that we use convey information on multiple spells per workers, thus allowing for shared frailty entails modelling
heterogeneity among workers as a random e⁄ect.




Table 4 displays the estimated coe¢ cients and the marginal e⁄ects for the employment duration model19.
According to our results all kinds of the allowed dependence are signi￿cant. In particular, we ￿nd evidence
of negative current duration dependence, i.e. the longer the time elapsed in a job spell the more likely the
worker will remain employed. We ￿nd that there￿ s signi￿cant lagged duration dependence, i.e. the longer
the previous unemployment spell the higher the risk of exiting the current employment spell. These results
support the evidence that unemployment episodes may have a scarring e⁄ect on future labor market histories
both in terms of subsequent earnings (Arulampalam, 2001) and in terms of subsequent risk of job separation
(Arulampalam et al., 2001 and Gregg, 2001). Moreover, according to the human capital theory explanation
the unemployment spell induces a deterioration of individual skills but also lower opportunity to accumulate
work experience: the longer an unemployment spell the higher the loss of productivity which induces a higher
probability of subsequent job termination. Indeed, the probability of being employed depends on the level of
wage at the beginning of the spell which seems to act as a proxy of the workers￿level of productivity: the
higher the wage at the beginning of the job spell the higher the worker￿ s productivity which contributes to
lower the probability of job termination.
Our results support the evidence of time dependence, too. In our speci￿cation, time dependence is
introduced by controlling for the worker￿ s age at the beginning of the job spells. We ￿nd that the older the
worker at the beginning of the spell the lower the risk of exiting it and the longer the job tenure. This pattern
reverses after reaching the middle age, as evidenced by the (signi￿cant) second order term of the polynomial
in age.
The risk of job separation is less likely for men than for women. Women are thus more likely to encounter
discontinuous careers. Job interruptions in the construction industry are more frequent than in the manufac-
turing and the services industries. North- Western and Central regions are those with longer job relations,
while shorter tenures characterize jobs in the South and North-East. Not surprisingly, the probability of
separation is monotonically decreasing with the dimension of the ￿rm, shorter tenures are more frequent in
small ￿rms and become longer as the average dimension increases. In our data, young cohorts face higher
job instability than older cohorts, which is not surprising since young cohorts are more a⁄ected by ￿xed-term
contracts with respect to the older cohorts.
Table 5 shows the results for the unemployment duration model. Our estimates document negative
19Negative marginal e⁄ects (positive coe¢ cients for the hazard rate) indicate that the covariates reduces the duration, while
positive marginal e⁄ects (negative coe¢ cients for the hazard rate) indicate that the covariates increases the duration.
11current duration dependence for the unemployment status. In addition, we support the evidence for all kinds
of duration dependence. In particular, Table 5 shows that the longer the past employment spell the higher
the chance of exiting the current unemployment spell becoming employed. This evidence supports the view
that the longer the employment spell the greater the productivity enhancement from the working experience
which may result in a higher probability of terminating the subsequent unemployment spell. Indeed, the
probability of remaining unemployed depends on the level of wage at the beginning of the spell. Here, we
are analyzing the unemployment duration, thus the wage measured at the beginning of the spell is the last
wage received in the previous employment spell. Our result indicates that the level of wage earned upon
termination of the preceding job experience taken as a proxy of the level of the workers￿productivity may
act as a signal a⁄ecting the chance of new job ￿nding.
Time dependence is signi￿cant also in determining the nature of the unemployment persistence: the higher
the age at entry the higher the chance of terminating the current unemployment spell, although this pattern
reverses at old ages as indicated by the second order term of the polynomial in age.
The chance of exiting the unemployment status is lower for females who are more likely to be involved in
non market activities than males (see e.g. Lynch, 1989).
In our speci￿cation, we evaluate the in￿ uence of last job occupation characteristics on the current un-
employment duration. Workers who face job interruptions from medium and large size ￿rms have a lower
chance of getting a new job. For workers in the Northern regions, especially Eastern ones, the hazard rate of
￿nding a job is higher than in the rest of Italy. These ￿ndings, together with the evidence on the duration of
job spells support the importance of local conditions in determining the dualistic nature of the Italian formal
labor market.
Finally, younger cohorts are more likely to exit from the unemployment spells with respect to older cohorts.
This evidence, coupled with the signi￿cant higher instability of job relations for younger cohorts is coherent
with the more widespread use of ￿ exible contracts for young workers since middle ‘90s, as documented in
Fugazza (2011), among others.
Importantly, in case of both employment and unemployment durations, our results are robust to the
unobserved heterogeneity.
According to our results, both duration and lagged duration dependence turn out to a⁄ect signi￿cantly
the transition process between the two states. Thus we have to rely on simulation techniques to derive the




t ) as well as the unconditional probability distribution of being unemployed
(pu
t ) over the life cycle. In particular, we simulate the entire working careers for the representative workers
of all G working groups.who are assumed enter the labor market at the age of 20 and to retire at the
12age 60. For each representative worker g we simulate, according to the estimated Weibull models, a large
number of possible survival times in the initial state, i.e. employment or unemployment. Using the same
methodology we simulate the ongoing spells until the age of 6020. In Figure 5; we report the life cycle pro￿les
for the transition distributions ￿ee
t and ￿eu
t implied by the simulated working life careers. Both are hump
shaped with respect to age implying an hump shaped probability of being employed and thus a "U" shaped
unemployement probability pro￿le over the life cycle.
5 Empirical analysis of advanced withdrawals
5.1 Econometric speci￿cation
In this section we carry out the analysis on the advanced withdrawing behavior. The decision of taking an
advanced withdrawal is modelled through a latent variable Y ￿
Y ￿
it = ￿i + ￿0XB
it + uit (9)
and
WITH = 1 if Y ￿ > 0 (10)
WITH = 0 otherwise (11)
XB
it is the vector of observed demographic and occupational characteristics for the individual i time t, ￿i is
the individual random e⁄ect21 and WITH is the indicator variable introduced in section 3 denoting whether
the worker i at time t takes an advanced withdrawal from the existing stock of TFR . In this work, we favour
random against ￿xed e⁄ects since a large number of workers do not display time variation in the withdrawing
behavior22. Among explanatory variables introduced and discussed in section 3 we include a third order
polynomial in age, gender, industry, geographic area, ￿rm size, type of occupation, the birth year cohort, the
logarithm of annual earnings received in year t and the logarithm of the accumulated stock of TFR at the
end of previous year (t ￿ 1).
20In the Appendix we outline the simulation technique followed to derive the probability distributions of interest.
21We assume that individual speci￿c e⁄ects are unrelated to observable characteristics restricting the distribution of hetero-
geneity.
22In section 3, we show that the 95% of individual-year pairs is not a⁄ected by advanced withdrawals.
135.2 Results
In Table 6 we report the results for the coe¢ cient estimates and their standard errors 23. The cubic polynomial
function captures well the hump-shaped age pro￿le of withdrawals at young ages, when probably the TFR
is used to ￿nance the home purchase and when people are more likely to face liquidity constraints. The
probability of taking a withdrawal is in fact increasing with age till 35 ￿ 40 years old and then sligthly
decreases (see Figure 7). These results can be reconciled with the empirical evidence on liquidity constraints.
In Jappelli (1990), Cannari and Ferri (1997) and Fabbri and Padula (2001) is shown that the age has a
negative e⁄ect on the probability of being liquidity constrained. Magri (2002) found that age has a positive
e⁄ect on the demand of debt and that the probability of being subscriber of a mortgage increases until middle
ages. Since the Liquidity-TFR plays the strongest role when individuals are young and are more likely to face
binding liquidity constraints, we conjecture that it is used more likely for home purchasing than for medical
care expenses.
Women are less likely to take withdrawals than men and on average blue collars are more likely to
withdraw than white collars. Workers in Southern of Italy are more likely to take advanced withdrawals.
The sector of activity is signi￿cantly relevant in order to disentangle which group of workers is more likely
to take a withdraw from their TFR while our analysis does not evidence a clear cut relation between ￿rm
size and the chance of taking withdrawal. The data show that, with respect to workers employed in the
construction industry, those who work in manufacturing and in services are less likely to take a withdrawal.
Younger cohorts show a higher probability of taking advanced withdrawals. Finally, the probability is higher
the lower the level of annual labor income and the higher the accumulated stock of TFR supporting the
view that anticipated withdrawals from the TFR are taken to overcome liquidity constraints when also credit
rationing is at playing. Taking the type of occupation as a proxy of the level of education attained we
can reconcile our results with the empirical evidence on the impact of personal characteristics on both the
debt market participation and on the probability of being liquidity constrained. Magri (2002) ￿nds that less
educated people and in general low income earners are more likely to face credit constraints in terms of loan
size. Thus, these results seem to con￿rm that advanced withdrawals are taken more frequently in case of
liquidity constraints combined with the higher chance of being credit rationed.
23The performed Wald test indicates that the coe¢ cients are jointly signi￿cant at 10% level. The log-likelihood ratio test
con￿rms that the panel-level variance component is important. supporting the preference for the panel over the pooled estima-
tion.The estimator used relies on Gauss-Hermite quadtrature to evaluate the log likelihood and derivatives. Results are stable
under alternative quadrature approximations.
146 Expected evolution of the TFR
In this section we report results for the expected distribution of the TFR over the life cycle ((5)-(7)). For
each working group g;we evaluate the potential amount TFRt available at each age conditional on being





t ) as well as (￿t) the advanced withdrawal behavior predicted according to the model
estimated in section 524.
In Tables 7 and 8, we report for male and female workers the expected distribution of the TFR among
the tree components (5)￿(7):The results are reported by working groups de￿ned according demographic and
occupational characteristics: gender, type of occupation, geographic area, industry and ￿rm size, age and
birth year cohort. In Tables 7 and 8; we focus on the expected composition of the TFR evaluated for workers
belonging to three birth year cohorts (1950 -59, 1960-69, 1970-79), at the age of 25; 40 and 60 years old and
working in small and large ￿rm size (with less than 10 and more than 1000 employees, respectively).
According to our results the portion of the TFR that is expected to be accumulated until retirement
represents the main component being on average about 67% against an amount of 31% that is expected to be
paid upon job separation, while the remaining 2% is on average withdrawn in advance to ￿nance speci￿c needs.
In particular, the amount that is expected to be accumulated as Retirement-TFR is positively correlated with
the employment probability which is hump shaped over the life cycle with substantial heterogeneity across
working groups. Males workers and white collars display the highest amount of TFR that is expected to be
accumulated until retirement. As shown in Tables 7 and 8, at the age of 60, the average expected Retirement-
TFR accumulated by male workers is about 71% of the total while the corresponding value for females is
about 64%. The gender gap is higher for blue than white collars. For blue collars, who experience higher
job instability over the life cycle, the average amount that is expected to be available as Retirement-TFR is
about the 65% for males and 57% for females. The average expected Retirement-TFR for males white collars
is about 77% while for females is 70%. Di⁄erences among females and males are stronger in southern regions.
Workers in the North of Italy display more stable working life careers which implies an expected Retirement
￿ TFR higher of about 8% than workers in south, a gap that is less strong for male workers (7%) than for
females (9%).
Di⁄erences in job mobility imply also a great dispersion of the expected Bu⁄er-TFR across workers.
The amount potentially available as a bu⁄er displays a ￿U￿shaped pro￿les over the life cycle re￿ ecting the
dynamics of the individual probability of job separation with respect to age. At middle ages (40 years old),
the di⁄erence in the amount expected to be available for blue and white collars is about 13% while the gap
24The annual labor income yt is proxied by the average value observed by age, gender and type of occupation. The annual
in￿ation ￿t is set to the value of 2%.
15between females and males is about 8%; on average. For workers in southern region the potential bu⁄er
component is on average 10% higher than for workers in the North West. The di⁄erent degree of job stability
at industry level leads to an expected Bu⁄er-TFR for workers in the construction industry on average 12%
higher than in the manufactory industry. The average gap in the expected bu⁄er component explained by the
￿rm size is modest. The amount in small ￿rms is on abverage 8% higher than in large ￿rms. This evidence
contrasts sharply with Fugazza and Teppa (2005) who perform a similar empirical analysis and ￿nd that the
variation of the expected Bu⁄er-TFR is almost explained by the average dimension of the ￿rm. However,
Fugazza and Teppa (2005) evaluate the proportion of the TFR that is expected to paid during the working
life considering job separations only, which are higher for small ￿rms. In this paper, instead, we look at the
entire working life, and thus we thus we take into account the probability of job separation conditional on
being employed and the chance re-employment at each stage of the life cycle. Thus, the observed relatively
modest gap between small and large ￿rms is due to the composition e⁄ect between the probability of job
separation - higher for workers in small ￿rms, and the probability of re-employment - lower if workers are
dismissed by large ￿rms. These results suggest that there is a potential relevant role for the Bu⁄er-TFR,
which is stronger for the young, the women and the blue collars who work in small ￿rms operating in the
less developed geographic areas. In the present work we estimated the importance of the TFR as a potential
bu⁄er for precautionary motives on the basis of administrative data which do not allow to evaluate the actual
role played bythe TFR withdrawn.
As reported in Tables 7 and 8, the Liquidity-TFR accounts for a small proportion of the accumulated TFR
for all representative workers. The proportion of the accumulated TFR that is expected to be withdrawn in
advance is humped shaped over the life cycle when both the accumulated TFR and the probability of being
employed are higher relatively to young and old ages. The highest values are found at middle ages for all
working groups. Men and white collars exhibit the highest expected amount of withdrawing, on average 1%
higher than women and blue collars25. Since our analysis is based on administrative data we are not able to
distinguish between advanced withdrawals for home purchasing or for health reasons. However, we observe
that, ceteris paribus, the Liquidity-TFR plays the strongest role when workers are relatively younger and/
or likely face binding liquidity constraints we conclude that the amount withdrawn in advance is probably
mostly used to buy a house.
25According to results in section 5, white collars have a lower propensity to take advanced withdrawals. However, here we
evaluate the expected proportion of the amount taken in advance, which is a⁄ected also by the probability of being employed.
167 Conclusions
In this paper we ￿nd that on average the main potential role of the TFR is to ￿nance consumption upon the
termination of working life careers, de￿ned here Retirement-TFR. This evidence points to the role of this
form of wealth in ￿nancing retirement accounts which is at the basis of recent reforms that encourage the
diversion of the TFR to pension funds.
In particular, the Retirement-TFR is positively correlated with the probability of experiencing continuous
job careers and is negatively related to the propensity of taking advanced withdrawals during the same
job. The individual employment probability pro￿les is derived taking into account both the probability
of job separation and the chance of re-employment over the life cycle evidencing substantial heterogeneity
across workers according to demographic characteristics and belonging to di⁄erent industries, regions and
occupations. In particular, some working groups face relative high job instability due to high probability of
job separation and lower chance of re-employment, namely females, blue collars, workers in the construction
industry and in southern regions. Our results show that for these working groups the TFR that it is expected
to be accumulated until retirement may be relatively modest threatening its role as retirement wealth. The
main limit of our analysis is that we do not have information on consumption and saving decisions nor on
how the TFR obtained at job separation is spent, which prevents us to measure how much of it is used as
precautionary savings or to increase other forms of private savings. However, our results are obtained taking
into account the risk of job separation as well as the probability of re-employment, thus, if we do not provide
a precise measure of the role of TFR, at least we are able to indicate the expected amount that fails to
accumulate until retirement.
The empirical analysis on the determinants of withdrawals points out that only a minority of workers
cashes out their TFR during the working life. Our results seem to be consistent with those on the demand
of mortgages and on home ownership. Indeed, since withdrawals from TFR are more frequent at young ages
we conclude that it is likely used by individuals to face home purchasing rather than for health.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Simulating the working careers
In this Appendix, we outline the simulation methodology used to obtain the pro￿les of the expected life cycle
working careers from the estimated transition intensities from employment to unemployment and vicevesa.
According to results reported in section 4, the transition process between the two states of interest
(employment and non-employment) is as a non-homogeneous semi Markov chain. Both duration and lagged
duration dependence turn out to a⁄ect signi￿cantly the transition process between the two states. Thus, to
derive the transition probability distributions at each point of the working life we have to rely on MonteCarlo
simulation techniques.
In particular, for each representative worker g, we simulate the entire working careers. We assume that
working life careers stat at the age of 20 and lasts at the age of 60 years old. At the age of 20, the representative
worker may be either employed or unemployed, being the initial probability distribution of the two states is
taken from the empirical fraction of employed to non employed at that age. We simulate the survival time T
in the initial state employment (unemployment). In particular, we simulate a large number N (N = 5000)
of lengths for the ￿rst employment (unemployment) spell by drawing from the Weibull distribution with
shape and scale parameters that depends on the value of the covariates as well as the estimated coe¢ cients
(see Table 3 and 4). As the aim is to generate the working histories for the average representative worker
of each group g, the parameter governing the individual heterogeneity ￿ is set to 1. The survival time T
is thus function of the individual and job characteristics that remain ￿xed over the life cycle but also on
characteristics that vary over the life cycle: the age and the daily salary at the beginning of the spell and
the duration of the previous simulated unemployment (employment) spell26 Using the same methodology
we simulate the ongoing spells. Thus, for each representative worker, we end up with N simulated working
histories, i.e. sequences of employment and unemployment spells. From each sequence, we can determine the
employment status at each age and by averaging across sequences we can obtain the both the conditional
and the unconditional probability of being employed /unemployed at each point of the life cycle.
26In simulations, the daily salary at the beginning of the spell is proxied by the average daily salary observed by age, gender







Table 1            Summary statistics on the sample composition 










 length≥4 years 
Female  0.35  0.35  0.33 
Male  0.65  0.65  0.67 
                                    Females  Males  All     
Manufacturing  0.38  0.37  0.37  0.42  0.58 
Construction  0.01  0.27  0.18  0.18  0.09 
Services  0.60  0.36  0.45  0.40  0.33 
North West  0.30  0.27  0.28  0.28  0.36 
North East  0.32  0.22  0.26  0.23  0.24 
Center  0.19  0.16  0.17  0.18  0.19 
South  0.19  0.35  0.29  0.31  0.22 
Firm size            
 1 - 9   0.41  0.40  0.40  0.40  0.28 
 10 - 19  0.15  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.15 
 20 - 199  0.27  0.30  0.29  0.29  0.33 
 200 -999  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.12 
 > 1000  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.13 
Blue collar  0.67  0.88  0.80  0.81  0.74 
White collar  0.33  0.12  0.20  0.19  0.26 
Cohort 1940 - 49  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.16  0.28 
Cohort 1950 - 59  0.19  0.20  0.20  0.21  0.24 
Cohort 1960 - 69  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.37  0.33 
Cohort 1970 - 79  0.30  0.29  0.29  0.27  0.16 
                               Median           
Age at entry  26  28  27  29  28 
Daily salary  56.49  66.00  63.09  60.39  64.76 
Annual earnings  15,615.08 17,850.98 17149.16    19,772.4 
TFR  2,985.00  3,110.93  3,073.95    5,282.615 
Duration (in years)  1.16  1.00  1.08  0.69  6.92 
Num. spells  50,992  94,905  145,897  100,246  45,571 
Num subjects  17,445  44,737  62,182  62,182  28,459 
Source: WHIP, Work Histories Italian Panel, years 1985-2002. 
Note: In case of unemployment spells, occupational characteristics refer to the last job spells preceding the current 
unemployment spell. 
 




Table 2       Average duration (in years) 
Age class  Employment  Unemployment 
20 - 25  2.99  3.2 
25-30  2.72  2.9 
30-40  2.72  2.7 
40-55  2.5  1.8 
> 55  1.4  2.75 










Table 3      Advanced Withdrawalas 
Individual and occupational 





Female  0.05  0.08 
Male  0.05  0.09 
Industry     
Manufacturing  0.05  0.097 
Construction  0.06  0.057 
Services  0.05  0.078 
Geographic Area     
North West  0.05  0.09 
North East  0.05  0.086 
Center  0.05  0.086 
South  0.06  0.069 
Firm size     
1 – 9  0.05  0.063 
10 – 19  0.05  0.084 
20 – 199  0.05  0.094 
200 -999  0.04  0.096 
> 1000  0.05  0.131 
Type of occupation     
Blue collar  0.05  0.08 
White collar  0.05  0.093 
Num. Observations  367,797  45,571 
          Source: WHIP, Work Histories Italian Panel, years 1985-2002   23
Table 4  
Employment Duration  Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Weibull model with unobserved heterogeneity 
Variable  Coefficients  Marginal 
Effects 
Age  -0.068***  0.091*** 
  [0.004]  [0.005] 
Age
^2/10  0.009***  -0.012*** 
  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Gender (ref. Male)     
Female  0.197***  -0.256*** 
  [0.013]  [0.016] 
Industry (ref. Services)     
Manufacturing  -0.457***  0.659*** 
  [0.011]  [0.018] 
Construction  0.119***  -0.152*** 
  [0.015]  [0.018] 
Firm size (ref. 1- 9)     
10-19  -0.125***  0.175*** 
  [0.012]  [0.017] 
20 - 199  -0.247***  0.352*** 
  [0.011]  [0.016] 
200 - 999  -0.475***  0.803*** 
  [0.017]  [0.036] 
> 1000  -0.427***  0.71*** 
  [0.02]  [0.041] 
Geographic area (ref. South)     
North West  -0.437***  0.659*** 
  [0.015]  [0.025] 
North East  -0.201***  0.285*** 
  [0.015]  [0.023] 
Center  -0.306***  0.46*** 
  [0.016]  [0.027] 
Type of occupation (ref. Blue collar)     
White Collar  -0.817***  1.492*** 
  [0.014]  [0.036] 
Length previous unemployment spell  0.155***  -0.208*** 
  [0.003]  [0.004] 
Log daily salary at the beginning of the spell  0.101***  -0.135*** 
  [0.012]  [0.016] 
Cohort (ref. 1979- 79)     
Cohort 1940-49  -0.010  0.015 
  [0.028]  [0.038] 
Cohort 1950 -59  -0.144***  0.202*** 
  [0.021]  [0.031] 
Cohort 1960-69  -0.185***  0.255*** 
  [0.015]  [0.021] 
Constant  1.129***   
  [0.081]   
α  0.895***   
  [0.003]   
θ  1.036***   
  [0.01]   
Log-likelihood    -58380.53      
N. observations  145,897   
           Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 ; standard errors are in brackets. 
           Source: WHIP, Work Histories Italian Panel, years 1985-2002 
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Table 5          
Unemployment Duration  Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Weibull model with unobserved heterogeneity 
Variable   Coefficients  Marginal 
Effects 
        
Age  0.068***   -0.033 *** 
    [0.004]   [0.002] 
Age
^2/10  -0.007***  0.004*** 
   [0.000]  [0.000] 
Gender (ref. Male) 
Female  -0.914***  0.558*** 
    [0.015]   [0.011] 
Industry (ref. Services)       
Manufacturing  -0.021*  0.002 
    [0.011]   [0.005] 
Construction  -0.191***  0.087*** 
    [0.015]   [0.008] 
Firm size (ref. 1- 9)       
  10-19  0.105***   -0.057*** 
    [0.011]   [0.005] 
 20 - 199  0.042***   -0.032*** 
    [0.01]   [0.005] 
200 - 999  -0.080***  0.019** 
    [0.017]   [0.008] 
 > 1000  -0.147***  0.055*** 
    [0.02]   [0.01] 
Geographic area (ref. South)       
North West  0.932***   -0.363*** 
    [0.015]   [0.006] 
North East  1.021***   -0.377*** 
    [0.016]   [0.006] 
Center  0.500***   -0.201*** 
    [0.017]   [0.006] 
Type of occupation (ref. White collar)       
Blue Collar  -0.415***  0.16*** 
    [0.014]   [0.005] 
Length previous employment spell  0.035***   -0.197*** 
    [0.003]   [0.002] 
Log daily salary at the beginning of the spell  0.016***   -0.016*** 
    [0.005]   [0.002] 
Cohort (ref. 1979- 79)       
Cohort 1940-49  -0.331***  0.113*** 
    [0.029]   [0.014] 
Cohort 1950 -59  -0.581***  0.03** 
    [0.023]   [0.013 
Cohort 1960-69  -0.439***   -0.165*** 
    [0.017]   [0.012] 
Constant  -0.583***    
    [0.065]    
α  0.850***    
    [0.002]    
θ  2.292***    
   [0.014]    
Log-likelihood  -128188.96    
N. observations  100,246    
                Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 ; standard errors are in brackets. 
                Source: WHIP, Work Histories Italian Panel, years 1985-2002 
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Table 6 Advanced withdrawing behaviour –Estimates of the multi-period logit model with random effetcts 
Variable   Coefficients 
Marginal 
Effects 
Age  0.238*** 0.007*** 
   [0.047]  [0.001] 
Age
^2/10  -0.050*** -0.002*** 
   [0.012]  [0.000] 
Age
^3/100  0.003*** 0.000*** 
   [0.001]  [0.000] 
Gender (ref. Male)     
Female  -0.173*** -0.005*** 
   [0.022]  [0.001] 
Type of occupation (ref. Blue Collar)     
White Collar  -0.240*** -0.007*** 
   [0.023]  [0.001] 
Geographic area (ref. Center)     
North West  -0.139*** -0.004*** 
   [0.026]  [0.001] 
North East  -0.124*** -0.004*** 
   [0.028]  [0.001] 
South  0.261*** 0.009*** 
   [0.031]  [0.001] 
Firm size (ref. >1,000)     
 1 - 9  0.252*** 0.008*** 
   [0.033]  [0.001] 
 10-19  0.330*** 0.011*** 
  [0.035]  [0.001] 
 20 – 199  0.288*** 0.009*** 
   [0.03]  [0.001] 
200 – 999  -0.032 -0.001 
   [0.034]  [0.001] 
Industry (ref. Services)     
Manufacturing  -0.145*** -0.005*** 
   [0.022]  [0.001] 
Construction  0.283*** 0.010*** 
   [0.035]  [0.001] 
Log earnings t-1  -0.406*** -0.013*** 
   [0.029]  [0.001] 
Log TFR t-1  0.712*** 0.022*** 
   [0.018]  [0.001] 
Tenure (Log years)  0.029 0.009 
   [0.029]  [0.001] 
Cohort (ref. 1940-49)     
Cohort 1950 -59  0.143*** 0.005*** 
   [0.040]  [0.001] 
Cohort 1960-69  0.294*** 0.009*** 
   [0.052]  [0.002] 
Cohort 1970 -79  0.406*** 0.014*** 
   [0.060]  [0.002] 
Constant  -11.348***   
   [0.580]   
σν  0.819   
   [0.042]   
ρ  0.169   
   [0.015]   
Log-Likelihood  -66192.225   
N. observations  367,797   
     Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: WHIP, Work Histories Italian Panel, years 1985-2002   26 
Table 7                 Expected Distribution of TFR – Male workers 
      A) Cohort 1950-59 
      Blue Collars  White Collars 
      Small  firms: 1-19  Large firms: >1000  Small  firms: 1-19  Large firms: >1000 
   Age  South  NorthWest
North 
East  Center  South  NorthWest
North 
East  Center  South  NorthWest
North 
East  Center  South  NorthWest
North 
East  Center 
      Manufacturing 
Retirement -TFR  25  0.66  0.72  0.69  0.71  0.77  0.83  0.80  0.81  0.77  0.82  0.80  0.81  0.86  0.90  0.88  0.89 
   40  0.66  0.72  0.69  0.70  0.77  0.83  0.80  0.81  0.78  0.83  0.81  0.81  0.87  0.90  0.89  0.89 
   50  0.63  0.71  0.68  0.69  0.77  0.83  0.80  0.81  0.77  0.83  0.81  0.81  0.87  0.91  0.89  0.89 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.33  0.26  0.30  0.28  0.21  0.16  0.19  0.17  0.22  0.16  0.18  0.17  0.12  0.09  0.10  0.10 
   40  0.32  0.25  0.28  0.26  0.20  0.14  0.16  0.15  0.20  0.14  0.16  0.15  0.11  0.07  0.09  0.08 
   60  0.35  0.27  0.30  0.28  0.21  0.15  0.17  0.16  0.21  0.14  0.17  0.16  0.11  0.07  0.09  0.08 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02 
   40  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04 
   60  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03 
      Construction 
Retirement -TFR  25  0.54  0.63  0.59  0.59  0.66  0.73  0.70  0.71  0.66  0.72  0.68  0.70  0.77  0.83  0.80  0.81 
   40  0.55  0.61  0.59  0.60  0.66  0.73  0.70  0.71  0.66  0.72  0.69  0.71  0.78  0.83  0.81  0.81 
   60  0.52  0.60  0.57  0.57  0.63  0.72  0.69  0.70  0.64  0.72  0.69  0.69  0.77  0.83  0.81  0.81 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.45  0.36  0.40  0.39  0.33  0.25  0.29  0.27  0.33  0.26  0.30  0.28  0.21  0.15  0.18  0.16 
   40  0.43  0.36  0.38  0.37  0.31  0.24  0.27  0.25  0.31  0.24  0.27  0.25  0.19  0.13  0.16  0.14 
   60  0.47  0.39  0.41  0.40  0.35  0.25  0.29  0.27  0.34  0.25  0.28  0.28  0.21  0.14  0.16  0.15 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
   40  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.05 
   60  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04 
      Services 
Retirement- TFR  25  0.58  0.65  0.62  0.63  0.70  0.77  0.74  0.75  0.70  0.76  0.72  0.74  0.81  0.86  0.83  0.84 
   40  0.60  0.64  0.61  0.62  0.71  0.78  0.74  0.75  0.70  0.77  0.74  0.74  0.81  0.86  0.84  0.84 
   60  0.56  0.63  0.60  0.61  0.68  0.76  0.73  0.74  0.69  0.76  0.73  0.74  0.81  0.87  0.84  0.85 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.42  0.34  0.36  0.35  0.29  0.22  0.25  0.24  0.29  0.22  0.26  0.24  0.18  0.13  0.15  0.14 
   40  0.39  0.33  0.36  0.34  0.27  0.20  0.23  0.21  0.27  0.20  0.23  0.22  0.16  0.11  0.13  0.12 
   60  0.43  0.35  0.38  0.37  0.30  0.22  0.25  0.23  0.29  0.21  0.25  0.23  0.17  0.11  0.14  0.12 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02 
   40  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04 
   60  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03 
   27 
  
(continued) - Expected Distribution of TFR – Male workers 
      Cohort 1960-69 
      Blue Collars  White Collars 
      Small  firms: 1-19  Large firms: >1000  Small  firms: 1-19  Large firms: >1000 
   Age  South  NorthWest
North 
East  Center South NorthWest
North 
East  Center  South  NorthWest
North 
East  Center South NorthWest
North 
East  Center
      Manufacturing 
Retirement -TFR  25  0.63  0.71  0.67  0.68  0.72  0.79  0.76  0.77  0.75  0.82  0.78  0.80  0.83  0.88  0.85  0.86 
   40  0.64  0.72  0.67  0.70  0.73  0.80  0.76  0.78  0.77  0.83  0.79  0.80  0.84  0.88  0.86  0.86 
   60  0.61  0.71  0.66  0.68  0.72  0.80  0.76  0.78  0.75  0.83  0.79  0.81  0.84  0.89  0.87  0.88 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.36  0.28  0.32  0.30  0.27  0.20  0.23  0.21  0.24  0.16  0.20  0.18  0.16  0.11  0.13  0.11 
   40  0.33  0.25  0.30  0.26  0.24  0.17  0.20  0.18  0.21  0.14  0.17  0.15  0.14  0.09  0.11  0.10 
   60  0.37  0.26  0.32  0.29  0.27  0.18  0.21  0.19  0.23  0.14  0.18  0.16  0.14  0.09  0.11  0.09 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
   40  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04 
   60  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03 
      Construction 
Retirement -TFR  25  0.52  0.61  0.57  0.58  0.61  0.70  0.66  0.67  0.64  0.72  0.66  0.70  0.74  0.81  0.77  0.78 
   40  0.55  0.62  0.57  0.59  0.63  0.70  0.66  0.68  0.66  0.73  0.68  0.71  0.75  0.81  0.78  0.79 
   60  0.51  0.59  0.56  0.57  0.60  0.70  0.65  0.67  0.64  0.73  0.68  0.71  0.74  0.82  0.78  0.79 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.47  0.38  0.42  0.40  0.38  0.29  0.33  0.30  0.34  0.26  0.31  0.27  0.25  0.17  0.21  0.19 
   40  0.43  0.35  0.40  0.37  0.35  0.26  0.30  0.28  0.31  0.22  0.28  0.24  0.22  0.15  0.18  0.16 
   60  0.48  0.39  0.42  0.41  0.39  0.28  0.32  0.30  0.34  0.24  0.29  0.25  0.23  0.15  0.19  0.17 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03 
   40  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.05 
   60  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04 
      Services 
Retirement- TFR  25  0.55  0.63  0.59  0.61  0.64  0.72  0.67  0.69  0.67  0.74  0.69  0.73  0.76  0.83  0.79  0.81 
   40  0.57  0.64  0.59  0.61  0.65  0.73  0.69  0.71  0.69  0.76  0.71  0.74  0.78  0.84  0.81  0.82 
   60  0.53  0.62  0.57  0.60  0.63  0.72  0.67  0.69  0.67  0.76  0.71  0.73  0.77  0.84  0.80  0.82 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.45  0.36  0.40  0.37  0.36  0.27  0.32  0.29  0.32  0.24  0.29  0.25  0.23  0.16  0.19  0.17 
   40  0.42  0.33  0.39  0.35  0.33  0.24  0.28  0.26  0.29  0.21  0.25  0.22  0.20  0.13  0.16  0.14 
   60  0.46  0.36  0.41  0.38  0.36  0.26  0.31  0.28  0.31  0.22  0.26  0.24  0.21  0.13  0.17  0.15 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
   40  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04 
   60  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03   28 
 
(continued) - Expected Distribution of TFR – Male workers 
      Cohort 1970-79 
      Blue Collars  White Collars 
      Small  firms: 1-19  Large firms: >1000  Small  firms: 1-19  Large firms: >1000 
   Age  South  NorthWest
North 
East  Center South NorthWest
North 
East  Center South  NorthWest
North 
East  Center South NorthWest
North 
East  Center
      Manufacturing 
Retirement -TFR 25  0.61  0.67  0.62  0.65  0.72  0.78  0.76  0.77  0.72  0.78  0.75  0.76  0.83  0.87  0.85  0.86 
   40  0.61  0.66  0.64  0.65  0.73  0.78  0.76  0.77  0.72  0.79  0.75  0.76  0.83  0.87  0.85  0.85 
   60  0.58  0.66  0.63  0.64  0.71  0.79  0.75  0.76  0.71  0.78  0.75  0.76  0.83  0.88  0.86  0.86 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.38  0.32  0.36  0.33  0.26  0.20  0.23  0.21  0.26  0.20  0.23  0.21  0.16  0.11  0.13  0.12 
   40  0.37  0.31  0.33  0.31  0.25  0.18  0.21  0.19  0.25  0.18  0.21  0.19  0.14  0.10  0.11  0.10 
   60  0.40  0.32  0.35  0.34  0.27  0.19  0.22  0.21  0.27  0.19  0.22  0.20  0.15  0.10  0.12  0.11 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
   40  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04 
   60  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03 
      Construction 
Retirement -TFR 25  0.51  0.55  0.53  0.55  0.61  0.67  0.65  0.65  0.60  0.67  0.61  0.64  0.72  0.78  0.75  0.77 
   40  0.52  0.57  0.53  0.54  0.61  0.67  0.64  0.65  0.62  0.67  0.63  0.65  0.73  0.79  0.76  0.76 
   60  0.49  0.55  0.54  0.53  0.58  0.66  0.64  0.63  0.60  0.66  0.63  0.64  0.72  0.78  0.76  0.76 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.48  0.44  0.46  0.44  0.38  0.32  0.34  0.33  0.38  0.31  0.37  0.33  0.26  0.20  0.22  0.21 
   40  0.47  0.40  0.44  0.43  0.36  0.29  0.32  0.30  0.35  0.29  0.33  0.30  0.23  0.17  0.20  0.18 
   60  0.50  0.44  0.45  0.45  0.40  0.31  0.34  0.34  0.39  0.31  0.35  0.33  0.26  0.18  0.21  0.20 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03 
   40  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.05 
   60  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04 
      Services 
Retirement- TFR 25  0.54  0.59  0.56  0.58  0.65  0.71  0.68  0.70  0.64  0.70  0.67  0.69  0.76  0.82  0.79  0.80 
   40  0.54  0.59  0.56  0.59  0.65  0.72  0.68  0.70  0.65  0.71  0.67  0.68  0.77  0.83  0.80  0.80 
   60  0.52  0.57  0.56  0.56  0.63  0.71  0.67  0.68  0.64  0.71  0.67  0.69  0.76  0.83  0.80  0.80 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.46  0.40  0.43  0.41  0.34  0.28  0.31  0.28  0.34  0.28  0.31  0.29  0.22  0.16  0.19  0.18 
   40  0.44  0.38  0.42  0.38  0.32  0.25  0.29  0.27  0.32  0.25  0.29  0.27  0.20  0.14  0.17  0.15 
   60  0.47  0.41  0.43  0.42  0.36  0.27  0.31  0.29  0.35  0.27  0.30  0.28  0.22  0.15  0.18  0.16 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
   40  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04 
   60  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03   29 
 
Table 8                      Expected Distribution of TFR - Female workers 
      Cohort 1950-59 
      Blue Collars  White Collars 
      Small  firms: 1-19  Large firms: >1000  Small  firms: 1-19  Large firms: >1000 
   Age  South  NorthWest
North 
East  Center South NorthWest
North 
East  Center  South NorthWest
North 
East  Center South NorthWest
North 
East  Center
      Manufacturing 
Retirement -TFR  25  0.49  0.59  0.56  0.57  0.55  0.65  0.61  0.63  0.61  0.71  0.65  0.70  0.68  0.77  0.71  0.75 
   40  0.53  0.65  0.59  0.62  0.59  0.70  0.64  0.68  0.67  0.76  0.71  0.75  0.73  0.81  0.77  0.79 
   60  0.53  0.63  0.58  0.62  0.59  0.69  0.62  0.67  0.67  0.77  0.70  0.74  0.73  0.82  0.77  0.80 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.51  0.40  0.44  0.42  0.45  0.34  0.39  0.36  0.38  0.28  0.34  0.29  0.32  0.22  0.28  0.24 
   40  0.46  0.34  0.39  0.36  0.40  0.29  0.34  0.30  0.31  0.21  0.26  0.23  0.25  0.17  0.21  0.19 
   60  0.46  0.36  0.41  0.37  0.40  0.30  0.37  0.32  0.32  0.22  0.28  0.24  0.26  0.17  0.22  0.18 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   40  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
   60  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02 
      Construction 
Retirement -TFR  25  0.44  0.55  0.51  0.52  0.48  0.60  0.55  0.58  0.55  0.66  0.61  0.64  0.62  0.71  0.66  0.70 
   40  0.46  0.58  0.54  0.56  0.52  0.65  0.59  0.62  0.61  0.71  0.66  0.68  0.67  0.76  0.71  0.74 
   60  0.48  0.57  0.52  0.56  0.54  0.63  0.58  0.62  0.61  0.70  0.63  0.68  0.67  0.76  0.70  0.74 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.56  0.44  0.48  0.47  0.52  0.40  0.44  0.42  0.44  0.33  0.38  0.35  0.38  0.28  0.33  0.29 
   40  0.53  0.40  0.44  0.41  0.47  0.33  0.39  0.36  0.38  0.26  0.31  0.28  0.31  0.22  0.27  0.23 
   60  0.52  0.41  0.47  0.42  0.45  0.36  0.41  0.37  0.38  0.28  0.35  0.29  0.32  0.22  0.28  0.24 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   40  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03 
   60  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03 
      Services 
Retirement- TFR  25  0.43  0.52  0.50  0.51  0.47  0.57  0.53  0.55  0.53  0.62  0.59  0.61  0.58  0.67  0.61  0.66 
   40  0.45  0.55  0.52  0.54  0.51  0.60  0.57  0.59  0.57  0.67  0.63  0.66  0.64  0.73  0.67  0.71 
   60  0.47  0.54  0.50  0.52  0.50  0.57  0.54  0.58  0.57  0.66  0.60  0.63  0.62  0.72  0.65  0.70 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.56  0.48  0.50  0.49  0.53  0.43  0.47  0.45  0.47  0.37  0.41  0.38  0.41  0.32  0.38  0.33 
   40  0.54  0.44  0.48  0.45  0.49  0.38  0.42  0.39  0.42  0.31  0.35  0.32  0.35  0.25  0.31  0.27 
   60  0.53  0.45  0.49  0.47  0.49  0.42  0.45  0.41  0.42  0.33  0.39  0.35  0.37  0.27  0.33  0.28 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   40  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
   60  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02   30 
 
(continued) - Expected Distribution of TFR – Female workers 
      Cohort 1960-69 
      Blue Collars  White Collars 
      Small  firms: 1-19  Large firms: >1000  Small  firms: 1-19  Large firms: >1000 
   Age  South  NorthWest 
North 
East  Center South NorthWest 
North 
East  Center  South NorthWest 
North 
East  Center South  NorthWest 
North 
East  Center 
      Manufacturing 
Retirement -TFR  25  0.54  0.64  0.61  0.62  0.64  0.74  0.70  0.72  0.69  0.77  0.73  0.75  0.78  0.85  0.81  0.83 
   40  0.57  0.66  0.62  0.64  0.67  0.75  0.71  0.73  0.71  0.79  0.75  0.76  0.80  0.86  0.83  0.84 
   60  0.53 0.65  0.60  0.61  0.64  0.75  0.70  0.72  0.69  0.79  0.74  0.76  0.79  0.86  0.83  0.84 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.45  0.35  0.38  0.36  0.35  0.25  0.29  0.27  0.30  0.21  0.26  0.23  0.21  0.14  0.18  0.15 
   40  0.41  0.32  0.36  0.33  0.32  0.22  0.27  0.24  0.27  0.18  0.23  0.20  0.18  0.12  0.15  0.13 
   60  0.46  0.34  0.39  0.37  0.35  0.24  0.29  0.26  0.30  0.20  0.24  0.22  0.20  0.12  0.15  0.14 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   40  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03 
   60  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
      Construction 
Retirement -TFR  25  0.46  0.55  0.51  0.53  0.53  0.64  0.60  0.61  0.57  0.67  0.62  0.64  0.67  0.76  0.72  0.74 
   40  0.48  0.57  0.54  0.54  0.55  0.65  0.61  0.62  0.60  0.68  0.64  0.66  0.70  0.77  0.74  0.75 
   60  0.45  0.54  0.51  0.51  0.52  0.63  0.58  0.59  0.57  0.67  0.63  0.65  0.67  0.77  0.73  0.74 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.54  0.44  0.48  0.47  0.47  0.35  0.39  0.38  0.42  0.32  0.37  0.34  0.32  0.23  0.27  0.24 
   40  0.51  0.42  0.45  0.44  0.43  0.33  0.37  0.35  0.38  0.29  0.33  0.30  0.28  0.20  0.23  0.21 
   60  0.55  0.45  0.48  0.48  0.48  0.36  0.41  0.39  0.42  0.31  0.35  0.33  0.31  0.21  0.25  0.23 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02 
   40  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04 
   60  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03 
      Services 
Retirement- TFR  25  0.48  0.57  0.53  0.54  0.56  0.66  0.62  0.64  0.60  0.69  0.64  0.67  0.70  0.78  0.74  0.76 
   40  0.50  0.59  0.54  0.57  0.58  0.68  0.63  0.65  0.62  0.71  0.66  0.69  0.72  0.80  0.76  0.78 
   60  0.47  0.56  0.52  0.53  0.55  0.66  0.60  0.63  0.60  0.70  0.65  0.67  0.70  0.79  0.75  0.77 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.52  0.42  0.46  0.45  0.44  0.34  0.37  0.35  0.39  0.30  0.35  0.31  0.30  0.20  0.25  0.22 
   40  0.49  0.39  0.44  0.41  0.41  0.30  0.35  0.32  0.36  0.27  0.31  0.28  0.26  0.18  0.22  0.19 
   60  0.52  0.43  0.47  0.46  0.45  0.33  0.38  0.36  0.39  0.29  0.33  0.31  0.29  0.19  0.23  0.21 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   40  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03 
   60  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02   31 
(continued) - Expected Distribution of TFR – Female workers 
      Cohort 1970-79 
      Blue Collars  White Collars 
      Small  firms: 1-19  Large firms: >1000  Small  firms: 1-19  Large firms: >1000 
   Age  South  NorthWest
North 
East  Center  South NorthWest
North 
East  Center  South NorthWest
North 
East  Center  South NorthWest
North 
East  Center 
      Manufacturing 
Retirement -TFR  25  0.54  0.62  0.58  0.59  0.62  0.72  0.66  0.70  0.66  0.74  0.69  0.72  0.75  0.82  0.78  0.80 
   40  0.56  0.64  0.58  0.61  0.64  0.73  0.68  0.70  0.68  0.75  0.71  0.73  0.77  0.84  0.81  0.81 
   60  0.52  0.61  0.57  0.59  0.61  0.71  0.66  0.68  0.66  0.75  0.70  0.73  0.76  0.84  0.80  0.82 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.46  0.37  0.41  0.40  0.37  0.27  0.33  0.29  0.33  0.24  0.29  0.26  0.24  0.17  0.20  0.18 
   40  0.43  0.34  0.40  0.36  0.34  0.25  0.30  0.27  0.30  0.22  0.26  0.23  0.21  0.14  0.17  0.15 
   60  0.47  0.37  0.42  0.39  0.38  0.27  0.32  0.30  0.33  0.23  0.28  0.25  0.23  0.15  0.18  0.16 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02 
   40  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03 
   60  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
      Construction 
Retirement -TFR  25  0.46  0.53  0.51  0.51  0.52  0.60  0.58  0.59  0.56  0.62  0.58  0.61  0.65  0.73  0.69  0.71 
   40  0.47  0.54  0.51  0.53  0.54  0.62  0.58  0.60  0.57  0.65  0.60  0.63  0.67  0.74  0.71  0.72 
   60  0.45  0.52  0.50  0.50  0.51  0.60  0.56  0.57  0.54  0.64  0.60  0.61  0.64  0.74  0.69  0.71 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.53  0.46  0.48  0.48  0.47  0.39  0.41  0.40  0.43  0.36  0.41  0.37  0.34  0.25  0.30  0.28 
   40  0.53  0.44  0.48  0.46  0.45  0.36  0.40  0.38  0.41  0.32  0.37  0.34  0.31  0.23  0.26  0.24 
   60  0.54  0.47  0.50  0.49  0.49  0.38  0.43  0.41  0.45  0.34  0.39  0.37  0.34  0.24  0.29  0.26 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02 
   40  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04 
   60  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03 
      Services 
Retirement- TFR  25  0.48  0.55  0.52  0.54  0.54  0.62  0.58  0.61  0.58  0.66  0.62  0.63  0.66  0.75  0.71  0.73 
   40  0.50  0.57  0.52  0.54  0.57  0.64  0.59  0.62  0.61  0.67  0.62  0.66  0.69  0.77  0.72  0.75 
   58  0.47  0.54  0.50  0.52  0.53  0.62  0.59  0.60  0.57  0.66  0.62  0.64  0.67  0.76  0.72  0.74 
Buffer-TFR  25  0.52  0.44  0.47  0.46  0.46  0.37  0.41  0.38  0.41  0.33  0.37  0.35  0.33  0.24  0.28  0.25 
   40  0.50  0.42  0.47  0.44  0.42  0.34  0.39  0.36  0.38  0.30  0.36  0.31  0.29  0.21  0.25  0.22 
   60  0.53  0.46  0.49  0.47  0.47  0.37  0.40  0.38  0.42  0.32  0.36  0.34  0.31  0.22  0.26  0.24 
Liquidiity-TFR  25  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   40  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03 
   60  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
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Figure 5        Transition probability distributions  
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